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NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY AFTER
CRAWFORD, DAVIS AND BOCKTING
Laird C. Kirkpatrick*
The 2004 decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Crawford v. Washington1 ushered in a new era of confrontation
jurisprudence. The ruling greatly strengthened a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment protection against testimonial hearsay by requiring that
it be subject to cross-examination either before or at trial in order to
be admitted. What was not made clear was whether criminal
defendants have constitutional protection against hearsay offered by
the prosecution that is found to be nontestimonial.
Before Crawford, the Supreme Court viewed all hearsay offered
against a criminal defendant as being subject to the Confrontation
Clause. Whether the hearsay was admissible depended on whether it
satisfied the two-pronged test of Ohio v. Roberts.2 Roberts required a
finding that the hearsay was reliable and a showing that the
declarant was unavailable. Roberts held that reliability could be
inferred without further inquiry if the statement fit a “firmly rooted”
hearsay exception. As for unavailability, later decisions limited this
requirement primarily to former testimony and to hearsay offered
under exceptions that were not “firmly rooted.”
Crawford clearly overruled Roberts with respect to testimonial
hearsay, holding that such hearsay must be subject to crossexamination regardless of whether a finding of reliability and
unavailability has been made. Thus, testimonial hearsay previously
admitted under Roberts will now be excluded if the crossexamination requirement is not satisfied. However, Crawford did not
overrule Roberts with respect to nontestimonial hearsay, although it
hinted that Roberts’s days might be numbered. The Court stated:
“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent
with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their
development of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an
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541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
448 U.S. 56 (1980).

approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause
scrutiny altogether.”3
And so the law stood for two years after Crawford—testimonial
hearsay was governed by Crawford and nontestimonial hearsay was
governed by Roberts.4 Then came the Supreme Court’s decision in
Davis v. Washington5 in 2006. In Davis, Justice Scalia, writing for
the Court, reached out to address an issue that was not before the
Court—the applicability of the Confrontation Clause to
nontestimonial hearsay. This issue was not briefed or argued in
either Davis or the companion case of Hammon v. Indiana,6 nor was
it a question the Court had accepted for review. Furthermore,
neither Davis nor Hammon had argued in the courts below that if
the hearsay in question was found to be nontestimonial its
admission would violate the Confrontation Clause,7 thus no claim of
error on this point was preserved. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia, in
language so cryptic that it escaped the attention of many readers of
the opinion, including the preparer of the headnotes,8 signaled his
view that nontestimonial hearsay was no longer subject to the Sixth
Amendment. After reaffirming that the primary focus of the
3

541 U.S. at 68.
See, e.g., Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 877 (5th Cir. 2005) (“With
respect to the statements at issue here—nontestimonial out-of-court statements in
furtherance of a conspiracy—it is clear that [Roberts] continues to control.”); United
States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 358 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he admission of nontestimonial hearsay is still governed by Roberts.”); United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d
703, 707 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Roberts’s standard to excited utterance); United
States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 338 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Crawford dealt only with
testimonial statements and did not disturb the rule that nontestimonial statements
are constitutionally admissible if they bear independent guarantees of
trustworthiness.”); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“Crawford leaves the Roberts approach untouched with respect to nontestimonial
statements.”); State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191, 202 (Conn. 2004) (“[B]ecause this
statement was nontestimonial in nature, application of the Roberts test remains
appropriate.”).
5
126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
6
Hammon’s brief does not address the issue. Brief of Petitioner Hershel
Hammon, Hammon v. Indiana, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (No. 05-5705), 2005 WL
3597706. Nor does Davis’s. Brief for Petitioner, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266
(2006) (No. 05-5224), 2005 WL 3598182.
7
Neither the Washington Supreme Court nor the Indiana Supreme Court
addressed the issue. See State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 850–52 (Wash. 2005);
Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 452 (Ind. 2005) (“[W]hether some nontestimonial
statements may be subject to Sixth Amendment limitations is not before us today.”).
8
James J. Duane, The Cryptographic Coroner’s Report on Ohio v. Roberts,
CRIM. JUST., Fall 2006, at 37, 38 (“The official syllabus to the Davis case prepared by
the Reporter of Decisions and the West headnotes to the opinion make no mention of
Roberts at all, much less any mention that Roberts was finally overruled in that case.
And the lower courts have thus far been almost completely unable to accurately
decipher what Davis said on that point.”).
4

Confrontation Clause is on testimonial hearsay, he stated that “[a]
limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional
provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its
perimeter.”9 Earlier in the opinion he stated that “[i]t is the
testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other
hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay
evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”10
Some lower courts viewed this dictum in Davis that appeared to
signal the death of Roberts as nonbinding,11 just as other dicta in
Crawford and Davis had been regarded as overly broad.12 However,
eight months later in Whorton v. Bockting,13 a unanimous Supreme
Court, again addressing an issue that had not been briefed or

9
126 S. Ct. at 2274. The phrasing in Crawford was that testimonial
statements were the “primary object” of the Confrontation Clause. In Davis Justice
Scalia wrote a broader statement that “only” a testimonial statement can “cause the
declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at
2273.
10 Id.
11 See the following post-Davis cases: Albrecht v. Horn, 471 F.3d 435, 468 (3d
Cir. 2006) (“Unless and until the Supreme Court holds otherwise, Roberts still
controls nontestimonial statements.”); Scott v. Jarog, No 03-73737, 2006 WL
2811270, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2006) (“With respect to non-testimonial hearsay
statements, Roberts and its progeny remain the controlling precedents.”). Cf. United
States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) (in the context of autopsy reports
admitted as public records, stating that regardless of “[w]hether the admissibility of
nontestimonial evidence also turns on an analysis of its reliability based on
requirements rooted outside the rules of evidence, the particular guarantees of
trustworthiness attendant to autopsy reports . . . make it unnecessary to resolve that
question in this case”).
On the question when lower courts should view a Supreme Court decision as
overruled based on dictum, see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (“[I]f a
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, [lower courts] should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions.”). On the appropriate criteria for identifying dicta, see generally Michael
Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005).
12 For example, the Crawford opinion listed business records as an example of
hearsay that is nontestimonial. 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (“Most of the hearsay
exceptions [in the Framers’ era] covered statements that by their nature were not
testimonial—for example business records or statements in furtherance of a
conspiracy.”). However, some records of regularly conducted activity fitting Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(6) would clearly be testimonial, such as investigative police
reports or a store detective’s report of shoplifting offered against a defendant in a
shoplifting prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390, 398–99 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2005) (refusing to adopt a per se exclusion of all business records from scrutiny
under Crawford); People v. Mitchell, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 613, 621 (Ct. App. 2005) (stating
that the Crawford Court did not intend that “all documentary evidence which could
broadly qualify in some context as a business record . . . automatically be considered
non-testimonial”).
13 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).

argued by the parties,14 stated that there is no constitutional
protection against nontestimonial hearsay. In an opinion by Justice
Alito, the Court said:
But whatever improvement in reliability Crawford produced . . .
must be considered together with Crawford’s elimination of
Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of
unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial statements. Under Roberts,
an out-of-court nontestimonial statement not subject to prior
cross-examination could not be admitted without a judicial
determination regarding reliability. Under Crawford, on the other
hand, the Confrontation Clause has no application to such
statements and therefore permits their admission even if they lack
indicia of reliability.15

The manner in which the Supreme Court has approached the
question whether criminal defendants have any constitutional
protection against nontestimonial hearsay is troubling. The answer
to this question has broad ramifications for how criminal cases are
tried and affects a large number of cases. According to a recent
survey, nearly one-third of the confrontation challenges before the
appellate courts have been held to involve nontestimonial hearsay.16
Yet there has been no briefing or argument on the question whether
there should be at least a minimal level of Sixth Amendment
scrutiny for some forms of nontestimonial hearsay. The Court has
staked out its position on the question, which is apparently to
exclude nontestimonial hearsay entirely from the protection of the
Sixth Amendment, without hearing argument from any of the
litigants who might actually be affected by such a ruling.
It was premature for the Court to resolve the constitutional
status of nontestimonial hearsay at a time when the definition of
testimonial hearsay is still so unsettled. The term testimonial
hearsay has not yet been clearly defined by the Court, hence the
scope of what is nontestimonial hearsay also remains significantly
undefined.17 Since Crawford, lower courts have held that the
14 The issue before the Court was the retroactivity of the Crawford decision,
and the Court held that it was not retroactive. The hearsay statements in question
had already been held to satisfy Roberts.
15 Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1183. The Court is in error in this statement.
Crawford did not hold that the Confrontation Clause has no applicability to
nontestimonial hearsay. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
16 See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747,
767 (2005) (noting that among approximately 500 published federal and state court
opinions applying Crawford between March 8 and December 31, 2004, nearly onethird of the courts reaching the merits distinguished Crawford on the ground that the
statements at issue were nontestimonial).
17 The Supreme Court has expressly declined to provide a comprehensive
definition of the term “testimonial.” Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273
(2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.

following types of hearsay statements are nontestimonial: a child’s
statements alleging sexual abuse made to family members, such as
parents or foster parents,18 as well as to medical personnel, such as
nurses19 or doctors;20 an accomplice’s statement describing a
murder-for-hire scheme to an acquaintance;21 recorded jailhouse
conversations between a defendant’s boyfriend and his visitors;22
private conversations with a friend;23 statements by a shooting
victim to her family at the hospital;24 domestic business records;25
foreign business records;26 autopsy reports;27 odometer statements
by sellers of used cars;28 a wide range of certifications, such as
certifications of the authenticity of public records,29 certifications of
the nonexistence of a public record,30 certifications attesting to the

18 People v. Virgil, 104 P.3d 258, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that
statements to father and father’s friend were nontestimonial); Herrera-Vega v. State,
888 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (admitting child’s statements to mother
and father reporting sodomy because statements were nontestimonial); People v. R.F.,
825 N.E.2d 287, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding as nontestimonial statements made
to mother and grandmother); In re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004) (finding that statements made to mother were nontestimonial); State v.
Bobadilla, 690 N.W.2d 345, 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that statements made
to mother were nontestimonial); Pantano v. State, 138 P.3d 477, 479 (Nev. 2006)
(admitting child’s statement to father concerning sexual abuse by another); State v.
Brigman, 615 S.E.2d 21, 24–25 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (admitting child’s statement to
foster mother because it was nontestimonial); State v. Walker, 118 P.3d 935, 942
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that statements to mother were nontestimonial).
19 State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 514–15 (Minn. 2006); State v. Krasky,
696 N.W.2d 816, 819–20 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that seven-year-old’s
statements to nurse practitioner about her father’s alleged abuse were
nontestimonial).
20 United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 896 (8th Cir. 2005); People v. Cage,
15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 854–55 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097, 1107
(Conn. App. Ct. 2006); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218, 224 (Mass.
2006); Foley v. State, 914 So. 2d 677, 685 (Miss. 2005); State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d
284, 287–91 (Neb. 2004); State v. Lee, No. 22262, 2005 WL 544837 (Ohio Ct. App.
2005).
21 Ramirez v. Dretke, 398 F.3d 691, 695 n.3 (5th Cir. 2005).
22 People v. Shepard, 689 N.W.2d 721, 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
23 Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2004); State v. Manuel, 697
N.W.2d 811, 823–25 (Wis. 2005) (collecting cases).
24 State v. Blackstock, 598 S.E.2d 412, 420 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
25 United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 927 (7th Cir. 2006).
26 United States v. Hagege, 437 F.3d 943, 958 (9th Cir. 2006).
27 United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2006); State v. Lackey,
120 P.3d 332, 348–52 (Kan. 2005); Rollins v. State, 866 A.2d 926, 953 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2005); Moreno-Denoso v. State, 156 S.W.3d 166, 180–82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
28 United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 2006).
29 United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005).
30 United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 830–34 (9th Cir. 2004); State v. N.M.K., 118

authenticity of a business record,31 and certifications of testing
devices;32 and laboratory reports identifying illegal substances or
measuring drug or alcohol content in defendant’s blood made for use
in criminal prosecutions,33 whether made by public or private
laboratories.34
It is possible that the Supreme Court may ultimately adopt a
definition of testimonial that will cover the hearsay in some of these
cases. But in the meantime, the constitutional questions raised by
these cases are too important and involve too many factual
variations to have been properly resolved without careful
consideration based upon full briefing and argument by the parties
affected.
I. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS
A full briefing and argument on the constitutional status of
nontestimonial hearsay would have allowed the Court to consider a
number of important questions. The first is whether eliminating
nontestimonial hearsay from the scope of the Confrontation Clause
will remove a constitutional safeguard that has played a vital role in
assuring fairness and balance in child sexual abuse prosecutions. If
Roberts is overruled in its entirety, this will have a particularly
significant impact on child sexual abuse prosecutions for three
reasons. First, many statements made by children offered in such
prosecutions have been found to be nontestimonial. Although a
child’s statements to a law enforcement officer, or an agent of law
enforcement, are generally considered to be testimonial under
Crawford,35 many statements by children alleging sexual abuse are

P.3d 368, 371–72 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that certification that defendant
lacks a driver’s license was nontestimonial).
31 United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 927 (7th Cir. 2006).
32 Rackoff v. State, 621 S.E.2d 841, 845 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that
certification regarding breathalyzer was not testimonial because not prepared for any
particular case).
33 Napier v. State, 827 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (demonstrating
that a toxicologist certificate was nontestimonial); Commonwealth v. Verde, 827
N.E.2d 701, 706 (Mass. 2005) (holding that toxicologist’s report on drug type was
nontestimonial); State v. Campbell, 719 N.W.2d 374, 376–77 (N.D. 2006) (identifying
evidence seized as marijuana).
34 Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (lab test from private hospital); People v. Meekins, 828
N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 2006) (private DNA lab).
35 See, e.g., People v. Warner, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 429 (Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that statements to police officer and child interview specialist were
testimonial); People v. Virgil, 104 P.3d 258, 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (demonstrating
that statements to a police officer and physician member of child protection team
were testimonial); Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798, 800–01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(requiring Sixth Amendment protection for statements made to a police investigator);

usually made first in private settings to caretakers, family members,
friends, teachers, doctors, or nurses. A large number of lower courts
have held that such statements made in private settings are
nontestimonial.36
A second reason why overruling Roberts will have a particularly
large impact on child sexual abuse prosecutions is that child
hearsay is often offered under hearsay exceptions that are not
“firmly rooted,” such as the residual exception or new statutory
exceptions designed specifically for child hearsay. While Roberts
accorded a presumption of reliability for hearsay that fits a firmly
rooted exception, it generally required a showing of reliability for
hearsay that does not fit a firmly rooted exception. Thus, child
sexual abuse prosecutions are an area where the reliability
requirement of Roberts had its greatest force.
Reports by children that are the product of suggestive
questioning can be unreliable, as has been demonstrated in a
number of nationally publicized cases.37 With the help of social
Flores v. State, 120 P.3d 1170, 1178–79 (Nev. 2005) (finding that statements to police
and child abuse investigator were testimonial).
36 See cases cited supra notes 18–20.
37 In 1983 and 1984, more than 350 children claimed to have suffered sexual
abuse at McMartin’s preschool in Manhattan Beach, California. After allegations by
one parent prompted the investigation, most of the other allegations came after
questioning by parents who received a letter from the police advising them that their
children might have been abused or by questioning by the Children’s Institute
International (CII), a Los Angeles abuse therapy clinic. Some of the allegations made
in the case were of a bizarre nature involving Satanic rituals, hot air balloon rides,
giraffes, and tunnels. After what is purported to be the longest and most expensive
criminal prosecution in United States history, Peggy McMartin Buckey was found not
guilty in 1990, and her son was acquitted of a number of charges, the remaining of
which were dropped after a hung jury on retrial. For an account of this case, see
EDGAR W. BUTLER ET AL., ANATOMY OF THE MCMARTIN CHILD MOLESTATION CASE (2001);
ELAINE SHOWALTER, HYSTORIES: HYSTERICAL EPIDEMICS AND MODERN MEDIA (1997);
Dorothy Rabinowitz, From the Mouths of Babes to a Jail Cell: Child Abuse and the
Abuse of Justice: A Case Study, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, May 1990, at 52; Buckey v.
County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 999 (1992)
(Peggy McMartin Buckey’s post-acquittal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the county,
county district attorney, child abuse investigation institute, and child abuse
investigator).
In East Wenatchee, Washington, based on evidence gathered from unrecorded
questioning of sixty children who signed statements after extended periods of
interrogation, 27,726 child sexual abuse charges were brought against forty-three
adults in 1994. Most of the charges were ultimately dismissed; many of the
convictions were overturned on appeal; and other defendants were freed after plea
bargaining. Timothy Egan, Pastor and Wife Are Acquitted on All Charges in Sex-Abuse
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1995, at A24; John K. Wiley, Two Wenatchee Sex Abuse
POST-INTELLIGENCER,
June
8,
2000,
Defendants
Released,
SEATTLE
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/wenaww.shtml; The Accused: Over Two Years,
43 People Were Charged with 27,726 Counts of Child Sex Abuse. 17 Were Convicted
and Remain in Prison. 4 Were Acquitted, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 1998,

science research, the legal system has gained an increased
understanding of the factors, particularly the susceptibility of
children to suggestive questioning, that bear on the reliability of
statements by young children.38 A leading case applying the Roberts
reliability requirement is Idaho v. Wright,39 which arose out of a
prosecution for child sexual abuse. In Wright, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Idaho Supreme Court which held that a young child’s
statements to a doctor alleging sexual abuse of both herself and her
sister lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify admission
under the Confrontation Clause. The Idaho Supreme Court found
that the statements lacked trustworthiness because the interviewing
physician used “blatantly leading questions,” had a “preconceived
idea of what [the child] should be disclosing,” and the interview
lacked procedural safeguards.40 The physician had apparently drawn
a picture during his questioning of the child that was no longer
available for inspection, and the Idaho court found that “the
at A6. Dr. Phillip Esplin, a forensic psychologist for the National Institutes of Health’s
Child Witness Project and expert witness in two of the Wenatchee trials, commented
that “Wenatchee may be the worst example ever of mental health services being
abused by a state . . . to control and manage children who have been frightened and
coerced into falsely accusing their parents and neighbors of the most heinous of
crimes.” Andrew Schneider, Wenatchee Abuses Attacked Nationally, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, May 28, 1998, at B1; see also Mike Barber, Wenatchee Must Pay Up,
Court Rules $718,000 in Sanctions Over Abuse Case is Confirmed by State Appeals
Panel, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 4, 2004, at B1; Debbie Nathan, Justice in
Wenatchee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1995, at A25.
See also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 868 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(explaining that “[s]ome studies show that children are substantially more vulnerable
to suggestion than adults, and often unable to separate recollected fantasy (or
suggestion) from reality”); State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1384–85 (N.J. 1994)
(reversing conviction of female nursery school teacher on 115 counts of sexual abuse
of children in her care on ground that convictions were based almost entirely on
statements by young children who had been subjected to sustained leading
interrogation); Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A
Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 403 (1993) (examining
interviewing practices that can produce false memory in children).
38 See, e.g., Maggie Bruck & Stephen J. Ceci, The Suggestibility of Children’s
Memory, 50 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 419 (1999); Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman,
The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 33 (2000); Jodi A. Quas et al., Individual Differences in Children’s and Adults’
Suggestibility and False Event Memory, 9 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 359
(1997); Anne M. Ridley et al., The Effects of State Anxiety on the Suggestibility and
Accuracy of Child Eyewitnesses, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 547 (2002); Daniel L.
Schacter et al., True and False Memories in Children and Adults: A Cognitive
Neuroscience Perspective, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 411 (1995); Amye R. Warren &
Dorothy F. Marsil, Why Children’s Suggestibility Remains a Serious Concern, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (2002);
Amye Warren et al., Inducing Resistance to
Suggestibility in Children, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (1991).
39 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
40 State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Idaho 1980).

circumstances surrounding this interview demonstrate dangers of
unreliability which, because the interview was not [audio or video]
recorded, can never be fully assessed.”41
The Supreme Court agreed that the child’s statements lacked
the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness necessary to satisfy
the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. Writing for the Court,
Justice O’Connor stated:
We think the Supreme Court of Idaho properly focused on the
presumptive unreliability of the out-of-court statements and on
the suggestive manner in which Dr. Jambura conducted the
interview. Viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the younger daughter’s responses to Dr. Jambura’s questions, we
find no special reason for supposing that the incriminating
statements were particularly trustworthy.42

Lower courts have generally read Wright as establishing that the
following four factors, along with other surrounding circumstances,
are appropriate to consider in determining the reliability of a child’s
statement alleging sexual abuse: (1) whether the child had a motive
to “make up a story of this nature”; (2) whether, given the child’s
age, the statements are of a type “that one would expect a child to
fabricate”; (3) whether the interview of the child was conducted in a
suggestive manner; and (4) the degree to which the child’s statement
was spontaneous, although noting that “[i]f there is evidence of prior
interrogation, prompting, or manipulation by adults, spontaneity
may be an inaccurate indicator of trustworthiness.”43
The Court rejected the “apparently dispositive weight” placed by
the Idaho Supreme Court on the lack of procedural safeguards at the
interview. While acknowledging that videotaping the child’s interview
and avoiding leading questions “may well enhance the reliability of
out-of-court statements of children regarding sexual abuse,” the
Court declined “to read into the Confrontation Clause a preconceived
and artificial litmus test for the procedural propriety of professional
interviews in which children make hearsay statements against a
defendant.”44
Nonetheless, the message was not lost on prosecutor’s offices
and child advocacy centers throughout the country—children’s outof-court statements are much more likely to be admitted under
Wright if they are videotaped and if the persons involved in
interviewing children who may be victims of child abuse are trained
to avoid overly leading, repetitious, or suggestive questioning. Wright
41

Id. at 1230.
Wright, 497 U.S. at 826.
43 Id.; see also, e.g., Webb v. Lewis, 44 F.3d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1994); Virgin
Islands v. Joseph, 964 F.2d 1380, 1388 (3d Cir. 1992).
44 Wright, 497 U.S. at 826.
42

has not only had a significant impact in changing the techniques
used in cases of suspected child sexual abuse,45 it has also provided
a constitutional safeguard against untrustworthy statements in the
thousands of child sexual abuse prosecutions that have been
brought since Wright was decided. 46
It is difficult to determine how many times trial judges have
excluded hearsay statements as untrustworthy by applying the
Wright/Roberts standard. Because prosecutors generally cannot
appeal, the case reports, for the most part, only reflect cases where
the statements were admitted and the defendant challenged that
ruling on appeal, not those cases where the hearsay statements were
excluded. The case reports also do not reflect how many times
prosecutors have refrained from offering hearsay statements of
questionable reliability out of concern for violating the
Wright/Roberts constitutional standard. But there can be little doubt
that Wright and Roberts have played a major role in child sexual
abuse prosecutions throughout the United States and have been key
precedents regularly taken into account by trial lawyers and judges
handling such cases.47 Yet if Roberts is overruled in its entirety,
Wright is also overruled sub silentio.
A third reason why Roberts has played a significant role in child
sexual abuse prosecutions is that a general consensus exists that it
is important to have the child testify when possible, given the nature
of the crime and the severity of the penalties. The Roberts
requirement that the declarant testify when available has generally
been interpreted to apply to hearsay offered under the catchall
exception as well as under the special child hearsay exceptions.48
45 See Thomas D. Lyon, Applying Suggestibility Research to the Real World: The
Case of Repeated Questions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 126 (2002); Dorothy F.
Marsil et al., Child Witness Policy: Law Interfacing with Social Science, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 241 (2002).
46 See generally Robert P. Mosteller, The Maturation and Disintegration of the
Hearsay Exception for Statements for Medical Examination in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (2002) (citing cases).
47 See generally Ronald J. Allen, The Expert as Educator: Enhancing the
Rationality of Verdicts in Child Sex Abuse Prosecutions, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 323
(1995); Allison C. Goodman, Two Critical Evidentiary Issues in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases: Closed-Circuit Testimony by Child Victims and Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule,
32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 855 (1995); John E.B. Myers et al., Psychological Research on
Children as Witnesses: Practical Implications for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom
Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3, 56–58 (1996).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Earles, 113 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
that when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, “the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable”); United
States v. Lang, 904 F.2d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Roberts as requiring
unavailability as a prerequisite to admission of hearsay under catchall exception);
United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1447 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing Roberts as
requiring a five-year-old victim’s unavailability, which was shown due to her young

Over the past several decades, evidence law has changed in
many ways that makes it easier for children to testify. Age-based
competency restrictions have largely been eliminated.49 States have
adopted statutes that authorize the appointment of a special
advocate to support the child during the legal process and that
sometimes even allow the advocate to sit with the child while his or
her testimony is given.50 In order to assist children with verbal
inhibitions, anatomically correct dolls are used to help children
describe genitalia or sexual activity.51 Many states, as well as the
federal government, authorize the presentation of a child’s testimony
by closed-circuit television or a videotaped deposition in situations
where testifying in court would be too traumatic or damaging to the
child.52
The constitutionality of presenting a child’s testimony by closedcircuit television, at least in cases where the child would be unduly
traumatized by taking the stand, was upheld in Maryland v. Craig53
over a vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia. In his dissent, he stated:
Because of this subordination of explicit constitutional text to
currently favored public policy, the following scene can be played
out in an American courtroom for the first time in two centuries: A
father whose young daughter has been given over to the exclusive
custody of his estranged wife, or a mother whose young son has
been taken into custody by the State’s child welfare department, is
age and fright, as a prerequisite to admission under catchall hearsay exception in
prosecution for child sexual abuse); Vaska v. State, 135 P.3d 1011, 1014 n.6 (Alaska
2006) (applying unavailability requirement under state residual hearsay exception in
child sexual abuse case); State v. Allen, 755 P.2d 1153, 1159 (Ariz. 1988) (same);
State v. Robinson, 699 N.W.2d 790, 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (same); Betzle v. State,
847 P.2d 1010, 1019 (Wyo. 1993) (same); cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360(a) (West 2004)
(providing that “statement[s] made by the victim when under the age of 12 describing
any act of child abuse or neglect performed with or on the child by another” is
admissible where statement is reliable and child is unavailable to testify).
49 See FED. R. EVID. 601; UNIF. R. EVID. 601; see also Nora A. Uehlein,
Annotation, Witnesses: Child Competency Statutes, 60 A.L.R.4TH 369 (1988).
50 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2163a(4) (2004) (allowing victim of child abuse “to
have a support person sit with, accompany, or be in close proximity to the witness
during . . . testimony”); MINN. STAT. § 631.046 (2003) (allowing “parent, guardian, or
other supportive person” to accompany child abuse victim at trial); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
7-11-408(b) (2005) (allowing advocate to accompany child sex-crime victim during
videotaped deposition).
51 See Monique K. Cirelli, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases:
Helpful or Prejudicial? People v. Beckley, 8 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 425, 426 n.18 (1991)
(collecting cases).
52 In the federal context, 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2000) permits the use of closedcircuit or videotaped testimony in child sexual abuse cases, codifying the holding of
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857–58 (1990). For state authorities, see Craig, 497
U.S. at 853–54 n.3 (collecting state statutes permitting child victim testimony via
closed-circuit in sexual abuse cases).
53 Id. at 857–58.

sentenced to prison for sexual abuse on the basis of testimony by
a child the parent has not seen or spoken to for many months;
and the guilty verdict is rendered without giving the parent so
much as the opportunity to sit in the presence of the child, and to
ask, personally or through counsel, “it is really not true, is it, that
I—your father (or mother) whom you see before you—did these
terrible things?” Perhaps that is a procedure today’s society
desires; perhaps (though I doubt it) it is even a fair procedure; but
it is assuredly not a procedure permitted by the Constitution.54

However, if a child’s statement in a private setting is considered
nontestimonial, a prosecutor could now apparently present the
child’s accusatory statement through a third party without calling
the child for cross-examination at all, let alone by means of closedcircuit television. Ironically Justice Scalia’s concern about the need
for confrontation in Craig can be completely circumvented under a
regime that simply eliminates the requirement of in-court testimony
by an available child when the child’s out-of-court statement is
found to be nontestimonial.
There is another point to consider. Almost all the statutory child
hearsay exceptions adopted by various states have been drafted with
the assumption that Roberts set forth the controlling constitutional
standard. Therefore they contain reliability and unavailability
requirements.55 If Roberts is dead, states would presumably be free
to modify these statutes and eliminate the reliability and
unavailability requirements from these hearsay exceptions or, for
that matter, to repeal the hearsay rule entirely with respect to
nontestimonial hearsay.
II. NEED FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION
A hearing focused on the constitutional status of nontestimonial
hearsay would also have allowed the Court to consider the fact that
in some cases defendants have a strong need to cross-examine
nontestimonial hearsay. Certainly the need to test, and refute if
possible, a hearsay statement is generally greater where the
statement is testimonial. But this is not always the case. The
54

Id. at 861 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (1995) (permitting introduction of hearsay
statements made by child sexual abuse victims, with unavailability and reliability
requirements); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360(a) (West Supp. 2007) (providing that a
“statement made by the victim when under the age of 12 describing any act of child
abuse or neglect performed with or on the child by another” is admissible where the
statement is reliable and the child is unavailable to testify); OR. REV. STAT. §
40.460(18a)(d) (2005) (allowing a special hearsay exception for children and persons
with developmental disabilities who allege sexual abuse, containing reliability and
unavailability requirements). The model for many state statutes is UNIF. R. EVID. 807,
which establishes a hearsay exception admitting the inherently trustworthy
declaration of an unavailable child victim of neglect or physical or sexual abuse.
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importance of testing and refutation is not necessarily a function of
the distinction adopted in Crawford, but turns rather on the content
of the statement and its importance and role in the case as evidence.
A nontestimonial statement can sometimes be as vital in convicting
a defendant as a testimonial statement. Two examples illustrate the
point.
The notorious trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603 is an important
part of the background of the Confrontation Clause, and was cited
repeatedly by Justice Scalia in Crawford as well as in Davis.56
Raleigh was convicted of treason and sentenced to death based on
the out-of-court statements of an alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham,
accusing Raleigh of plotting to overthrow James I. At trial Raleigh
pleaded for the court to “let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call
my accuser before my face.” But his request was denied, and Raleigh
was convicted and ultimately executed.57 His trial is frequently cited
as a powerful example of the criminal defendant’s need to confront
his accuser, and the perceived unfairness of his trial is generally
thought to be one of the reasons for the adoption of the
Confrontation Clause.58
But what if instead of speaking to an examining magistrate,
Cobham had spoken to a friend, described a plot that Raleigh had
allegedly devised to overthrow the Crown, and stated his intention to
“cast his lot with Raleigh.” In such a case, a prosecutor operating in
a post-Crawford world would likely be able to offer Cobham’s
statement through his friend’s testimony as a declaration against
penal interest. The statement would presumably not be testimonial,
because it was made in a private setting without any intent that it be
used as a basis for criminal investigation or prosecution. Yet if such
a hearsay statement accusing Raleigh of being the instigator of a
treasonous plot had been admitted, it is hard to imagine that Raleigh
would not still have made the same demand to “call my accuser
before my face.” Raleigh’s need to confront and cross-examine his
accuser would be as essential in the hypothetical trial as the actual
trial. If Raleigh had been convicted and executed on the basis of
such unsworn, out-of-court, uncross-examined evidence, it seems
doubtful that his trial would have been perceived as significantly
more fair than his actual trial. Yet under the position taken by the

56 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006); Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004).
57 The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh (1603), in 2 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF
STATE TRIALS 1, 1–60 (T.B. Howell ed., London, R. Bagshaw 1809).
58 One of the judge’s at Raleigh’s trial later commented that “the justice of
England has never been so degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir
Walter Raleigh.” 1 D. JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 520 (London, C. Knight 1832).

Court in Davis and Bockting, the admission of such hearsay would
not be considered even to raise a confrontation issue.59
A second example where a defendant’s need to cross-examine
nontestimonial hearsay could be as great as the need to crossexamine testimonial hearsay can be developed from the facts of
Indiana v. Hammon, the companion case to Davis. Police were called
to the Hammon’s home after Amy Hammon placed a 911 call
requesting assistance. After police arrived, her husband Hershel
Hammon was placed in a separate room while the police interrogated
Amy. She gave a statement to the police that said in essence:
“Hershel punched me and shoved me down causing my head to hit
the heater.” Hershel was arrested and prosecuted for domestic
violence. At the time of trial, Amy could not be located, refused to
appear, and did not testify. Instead her out-of-court statement made
to the police was introduced as an excited utterance through
testimony by police officers, and it served as the only direct evidence
establishing that Hershel had committed a crime.60 The Supreme
Court reversed Hammon’s conviction, holding that his right of
confrontation had been violated. The Court held that Amy’s
statement was “testimonial” because it was made for the primary
purpose of assisting a law enforcement investigation or prosecution
since the immediate emergency had passed by the time it was made.
The Court concluded that his wife was a “witness against” him
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, and that Hammon was
constitutionally entitled to cross-examine her about her accusatory
statement.61
But what if just before the police arrived Amy Hammon had
made an identical statement to her next-door neighbor, and that on
a retrial of the case the prosecutor offered the statement made to the
neighbor rather than the statement made to the police, again as an
excited utterance? Presumably Hammon’s attorney would argue that
59 Under Roberts, nontestimonial declarations against penal interest are
subject to constitutional scrutiny and have sometimes been excluded where found to
be unreliable. See, e.g., Sanders v. Moore, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1318–19 (M.D. Fla.
2001) (granting petition for writ of habeas corpus because of erroneous admission of
husband’s out-of-court statement to his wife that defendant had asked him to join a
conspiracy to murder defendant’s mother; such statement violated defendant’s right
of confrontation; it failed to fit within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception and was not
supported by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness); see also Miller v. State,
98 P.3d 738, 745–46 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (applying Roberts to exclude
nontestimonial hearsay offered as a declaration against penal interest); cf. People v.
Ewell, 98 P.3d 738, 745–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding lower court in excluding
nontestimonial statement on the grounds that the statement was not sufficiently
against speaker’s own penal interest, and in any case it lacked guarantees of
trustworthiness under Roberts).
60 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272–73.
61 Id. at 2278–79.

he had every bit as much need to cross-examine Amy Hammon at
the second trial as he had at the first trial (perhaps to suggest that
she slipped to the floor rather than being shoved). The fact that the
wife’s statement is now offered through a neighbor rather than
through the police would make no difference in terms of its
accusatory impact and would be entirely sufficient to convict
Hammon at the second trial. Yet if Hammon were to appeal his
second conviction, Hammon’s right to confront and cross-examine
his accuser, which the Court viewed as having such crucial
importance in the first trial, would apparently have no constitutional
significance whatsoever in the second trial, assuming that the wife’s
statement to the neighbor were found to be nontestimonial.62 As
Justice Scalia explained in Davis, declarants who provide
nontestimonial hearsay are not considered “witnesses against” a
defendant within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.63 Therefore,
the defense attorney would have the somewhat awkward task of
explaining to Hammon why his wife was a “witness against” him in
the first trial, and hence he was constitutionally entitled to crossexamine her, but that in the second trial she was not a “witness
against” him and he had no right to cross-examine her, even though
her accusatory words were identical and served as the basis for his
conviction in both trials.
It should be noted that in both of these examples and in any
other case where nontestimonial hearsay is offered against a
criminal defendant, the prosecutor now will apparently have the
tactical option, at least as far as the Confrontation Clause is
concerned, of introducing the hearsay statement without calling the
declarant to testify, even if the declarant is available and willing to
take the stand.64
62 See id. at 2274 n.2 (noting that, because victim’s statement was made to an
agent working in a law enforcement capacity, the Court was not called upon to
“consider whether and when statements made to someone other than law
enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial,’” thus, for the time being, leaving the scope of
the confrontation right limited to police interrogation); id. at 2278 n.5 (explaining that
“formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“An
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a
sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”). But
see Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J.
1011, 1042–43 (1998) (“A statement made by a person claiming to be the victim of a
crime and describing the crime is usually testimonial, whether made to the
authorities or not.”).
63 126 S. Ct. at 2273 (holding that only a testimonial statement can “cause the
declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause”).
64 Of course apart from Crawford and Davis, the Supreme Court has already
cut back on the unavailability requirement of Roberts by holding it inapplicable to
hearsay offered under a firmly rooted exception, such as the excited utterance
exception. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). But this is a decision that could

III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF CRAWORD
Finally, a hearing focused on the constitutional status of the
nontestimonial hearsay issue would have allowed the court to
consider whether the conceptual framework adopted in Crawford
necessarily requires excluding nontestimonial hearsay from any level
of constitutional scrutiny. In building the new framework that
focuses on testimonial hearsay, the Court relied in part on an 1828
dictionary defining witness, and on the limited historical record
pertaining to the drafting and adoption of the Confrontation Clause.
Arguably both sources were used somewhat selectively.
For example, in Crawford the Court stated: “The text of the
Confrontation Clause reflects this focus [on testimonial hearsay]. It
applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those
who ‘bear testimony.’ 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the
English Language (1828).”65 However, the definition quoted by the
Court is for when witness is used as a verb, and in the
Confrontation Clause, witnesses is used as a noun. As a noun,
Webster’s dictionary sets forth the following definitions of witness:
1. Testimony; attestation of a fact or event. 2. That which
furnishes evidence or proof. 3. A person who knows or sees any
thing; one personally present; as, he was witness; he was an eyewitness. 4. One who sees the execution of an instrument, and
subscribes it for the purpose of confirming its authenticity by his
testimony. 5. One who gives testimony; as, the witnesses in court
agreed in all essential facts.66

A limitation of witness to those who give testimony at trial is too
narrow and has been consistently rejected by the Court, including in
Crawford and Davis. Justice Scalia gives no explanation as to why
be revisited. Some states reject White and continue to impose an unavailability
requirement as a matter of state constitutional law. See, e.g., State v. McGriff, 871
P.2d 782, 790 (Haw. 1994); State v. Lopez, 926 P.2d 784, 789 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996);
State v. Moore, 49 P.3d 785, 792 (Or. 2002). Even where there is no federal or state
constitutional unavailability requirement, courts have sometimes been critical of
prosecutors who use hearsay statements for tactical advantage in preference to the
available testimony of the declarant. See, e.g., Beach v. State, 816 N.E.2d 57, 60 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004) (showing that the court gave warning when prosecutor offered
nontestimonial hearsay statement of domestic violence victim even though she was
available to testify when it stated that “the State would be well-advised to avoid the
tactic of introducing hearsay statements without calling the declarant to testify in
cases where the declarant is in fact available”). For suggested standards for when the
unavailability requirement should apply under Roberts, see Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN.
L. REV. 665 (1986) (arguing that whether to require unavailability should turn on the
centrality of the statement, its reliability, the likelihood that cross-examination could
realistically test it, and the adequacy of alternative means of challenge).
65 541 U.S. at 51.
66 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 114
(New York, S. Converse 1828).

the Framers of the Confrontation Clause would not have intended
the second or third definitions set forth in Webster’s—i.e., a person
who “furnishes evidence or proof,” or a person “who knows or sees
anything.” These are common and widely accepted definitions that
would encompass both testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay
when out-of-court statements by such “witnesses” are offered
against a criminal defendant. Moreover, these broader definitions are
more consistent with how the term witness has been construed
under other constitutional provisions, such as the Compulsory
Process Clause.67
With respect to the historical record, Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Crawford is a model of originalist interpretation of a constitutional
provision. It focuses on the likely intent of the Framers of the
Confrontation Clause based on the experiences, practices, and laws
of their time, as well as their apparent conception of fairness in
court procedures. However, one danger of originalism as a theory of
constitutional interpretation is that it may cause a Court to focus too
much on the specific issues facing the Framers at the expense of
their more general underlying concerns. Certainly in 1791, the
primary focus of the Framers was on ex parte examination of
witnesses, because that was a practice of the era that had generated
controversy. But the most difficult confrontation issues facing courts
today were not before the courts in 1791, so it is difficult to know
what the common law judges who developed the right of
confrontation or the Framers of the Sixth Amendment would have
thought of them. There were no special hearsay exceptions for child
hearsay or statements by domestic violence victims, statements to
diagnosing doctors, present sense impressions, declarations against
penal interest, and certainly no “catchall exception.”68 There were no
911 calls, rape crisis centers, or child advocates employed to take
statements from suspected child abuse victims.

67 See Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witness” in the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v.
Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155 (2006).
68 See Thomas Y. Davies, Not “the Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban
Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the
Scope of the Original Confrontation Right, 15 J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2007)
(“However, how could one logically infer that the Framers would not have applied the
Confrontation Clause to “nontestimonial hearsay” if framing-era law did not yet
recognize any exceptions under which informal, unsworn hearsay could arguably
have constituted admissible evidence in criminal trials in any event?”); Thomas Y.
Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional
Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005). But see Thomas
D. Lyon & Raymond Lamagna, Hearsay from Unavailable Child Witnesses: From Old
Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (asserting that child hearsay was
sometimes received in English criminal prosecutions during that era).

Surprisingly little material actually exists in the historical record
indicating the intent of the Framers themselves with respect to the
right of confrontation. Justice Scalia himself acknowledged as much
when he joined an opinion twelve years before Crawford that stated
“[t]here is virtually no evidence of what the drafters of the
Confrontation Clause intended it to mean.”69 His exhaustive
historical research in the Crawford opinion focused almost entirely
on chronicling the evolving practices of English and American courts
with respect to ex parte examination of witnesses and exploring how
the right of cross-examination came to be recognized for such
testimonial statements. It contains only two quotes pertinent to the
actual adoption of the Confrontation Clause, neither of which shed
any light on its possible application to nontestimonial hearsay.70
Thus while the historical record supports the conclusion that the
Framers had a heightened concern about testimonial hearsay, it
does not support a conclusion that the Framers neither had nor
would have had concerns about other forms of hearsay.71 Even if it
could be shown that nontestimonial hearsay was beyond the
contemplation of the Framers, the judicial construction of other
provisions of the Bill of Rights has not been limited only to matters
contemplated by the Framers at the time of ratification.72
Ironically, in Davis where Justice Scalia reached out to declare
nontestimonial hearsay a matter beyond the historical concern of the
Framers, he made the following comment in rejecting Justice
Thomas’s narrow interpretation of testimonial hearsay: “Restricting
the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was
originally directed is a recipe for its extinction.”73 This comment is
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White, 502 U.S. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring).
541 U.S. at 49–50.
71 Cf. id. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“As far as I can tell, unsworn
testimonial statements were treated no differently at common law than were
nontestimonial statements.”).
72 See, for example, cases construing the protections afforded under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, such as Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s proscriptions are
not limited to those practices condemned by the common law in 1789. . . . Not bound
by the sparing humanitarian concessions of our forebears, the Amendment also
recognizes ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))), and Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (“Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is
enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should not,
therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth.”).
73 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 n.5 (2006).
70
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IV. CONCLUSION
In Crawford, the Court held that the primary concern of the
Confrontation Clause is testimonial hearsay.74 In Davis and
Bockting, the Court reformulated this holding to say that the sole
concern of the Confrontation Clause is testimonial hearsay.75 Such a
reformulation has significant policy implications for future criminal
prosecutions, because as the Court acknowledged in Bockting, it
permits the admission of unreliable hearsay in criminal cases and
makes it “unclear whether Crawford, on the whole, decreased or
increased the number of unreliable out-of-court statements that may
be admitted in criminal trials.”76 This reformulation suggests that
the Court assumed a constitutional trade-off was required by the
reasoning of Crawford—enhanced protection against testimonial
hearsay and abandonment of any degree of Sixth Amendment
protection against nontestimonial hearsay. It is unfortunate that
before adopting this view the Court never entertained briefing or
argument on whether such a conclusive trade-off is actually
compelled by either history, policy, or traditional conventions of
constitutional interpretation.77
In adopting the new testimonial approach to confrontation
jurisprudence, the Court in Crawford made the point that the new
theory was largely consistent with the holdings, as distinguished
from the reasoning, of its prior confrontation decisions.78 Whether
that is true will depend on how broadly testimonial is ultimately
defined and particularly on whether statements made in private
settings can ever be testimonial.79 If the Court adopts a narrow
definition of testimonial, and if Ohio v. Roberts and Idaho v. Wright
are both indeed overruled, there will be a significant gap in
confrontation jurisprudence demanding further consideration by
both courts and commentators.

74 541 U.S. at 53 (“In sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely
concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object . . . .”).
75 See supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text.
76 Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1183 (2007).
77 The Davis case in particular seems a sharp departure from the stated
philosophy of Chief Justice Roberts, which has guided the Court in other areas, that
“[i]f it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, in my view it is necessary
not to decide more.” Shrinking Supremes, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 16–22, 2006, at 34
(quoting Chief Justice John Roberts).
78 541 U.S. at 57 (stating that Supreme Court case law “has been largely
consistent” with the testimonial theory adopted in Crawford).
79 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

